The oil tanker Encelia was sailing in the Red Sea on the evening of July 22, when a blast rocked the ship.
In an initial report, the ship’s master said none of Encelia’s crew were injured in the blast, but that they had to battle a resulting blaze.
Encelia’s crew wasn’t the first to face such hazards while sailing the Red Sea. Stepping forward to claim responsibility were Yemen’s Houthis, a Shia Muslim insurgency and terrorist group that has carried out dozens of attacks on commercial ships in the Red Sea in recent years.
Though the Houthis described the July 22 strike on the Saudi Arabian-flagged Encelia as retaliation for a Saudi siege of Yemen, the attack followed intensifying fighting between the United States and Iran. Throughout their history, the Houthis have proven a perennial ally of Iran and a persistent challenge to U.S. regional objectives.
Ahead of the Encelia attack, the Houthis announced their intent to blockade Saudi shipping in the Bab el-Mandeb. The blockade parallels Iran’s efforts to constrain trade through the Strait of Hormuz after U.S. and Israeli forces attacked on Feb. 28.
Rising Houthi attacks could exacerbate market disruptions already brought on by attacks on shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.
Following the attack on Encelia, President Donald Trump vowed to retaliate against any further attacks by striking both the Houthis and Iran. The Houthis have since traded fire with Saudi-led forces, and claimed multiple hits on oil infrastructure in Saudi Arabia.
Experts have differing opinions on whether fresh U.S. strikes will deter the Houthis.
Houthi Evolution
The Houthi movement began in the 1990s to revive Zaydi Shia culture in Yemen. The movement grew increasingly militant as it clashed with Yemen’s internationally recognized government in the ensuing years.
In September 2014, the Houthis entered Yemen’s capital, Sanaa. By early 2015, they solidified control over the capital and unseated the government.
After the Sanaa takeover, Saudi Arabia formed a coalition of neighboring states to stage a military intervention on the deposed Yemeni government’s behalf. The U.S. government has furnished this coalition with intelligence and logistics support, and weapons sales.
By March 2015, this Saudi-led coalition had commenced strikes on Houthi strongholds. In turn, the Houthis mounted cross-border missile attacks on Saudi Arabia.
In April 2018, the Houthis claimed responsibility for an attack that struck a Saudi-flagged tanker, showcasing a tactic they’ve repeatedly returned to in the years since.

A Greek oil tanker burning after an attack by Yemen’s Iran-aligned Houthis in the Red Sea, on Sept. 6, 2024. Planet Labs Inc./Reuters
Citing attacks on shipping and other cross-border attacks that have threatened civilians, the first Trump administration designated the Houthis a foreign terrorist organization in January 2021. President Joe Biden’s administration reversed the terrorism designation just weeks later, citing concerns it would impede flows of humanitarian aid to the Yemeni people during a protracted period of famine.
The Houthis currently control an area of northwest Yemen where about 80 percent of the country’s population resides.
“They’re the ones who decide who eats in Yemen, and while that construct is in place, it can’t get better, unfortunately,” Victoria Coates, vice president for national security at the Heritage Foundation, told The Epoch Times.
The Yemeni internal conflict has been at a standstill for years. Much of the fighting subsided with a 2022 truce.
After Hamas attacked Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, and returned to the Gaza Strip with 251 captives, the Houthis turned their attention outward.
As Israeli troops entered the Gaza Strip to recover their hostages and dismantle Hamas, the Houthis proclaimed solidarity with the Palestinian cause. The Yemeni group began launching new missile and drone attacks targeting Israeli interests and Red Sea shipping, and vowed to continue these efforts as long as the Israeli campaign in Gaza continued.
Between the end of 2023 and the beginning of 2025, the Houthis claimed responsibility for attacks on dozens of ships in the Red Sea and its adjoining waterways. Those attacks killed four sailors, sank two vessels, and damaged several others.
In January 2024, as Houthi attacks on the Red Sea grew, the Biden administration directed U.S. forces to begin striking Houthi strongholds in Yemen. When Biden announced a ceasefire and peace framework for Gaza in his final days in office, the Houthis stopped their Red Sea attacks, and U.S. forces ceased strikes on Yemen.

An aircraft launches from the USS Harry S. Truman in the Red Sea before airstrikes in Sanaa, Yemen, on March 15, 2025. U.S. Navy via AP
Within days of assuming office for a second time in January 2025, Trump took steps to redesignate the Houthis as a foreign terrorist organization. Still, the informal truce between the United States and the Houthis held for several more weeks, until the Gaza ceasefire collapsed in March 2025.
As Israeli forces resumed combat operations in Gaza, the Houthis announced they would resume attacks on Israeli shipping in the Red Sea. In response, Trump directed U.S. forces to launch a new bombing campaign against the Houthis, dubbed Operation Rough Rider.
The Houthis responded by launching missiles and drones at U.S. warships in the region, but did not manage to land a blow.
On May 6, 2025, after 52 days of strikes, Trump said the Houthis had given up and announced Operation Rough Rider’s conclusion. The Houthis pushed back, saying the new truce only covered direct fighting with the United States, but didn’t impact their ability to target Israeli interests.
In July 2025, the Houthis claimed attacks that sank two more cargo ships and killed four sailors. They claimed responsibility for another attack in September 2025, in which another sailor was killed.
Assembling an Arsenal
Much of the Houthi threat on the Red Sea comes from their stocks of ballistic missiles and explosive-laden drones. They’ve managed to assemble this arsenal despite a United Nations embargo on arms shipments to Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen.
The Houthis appear to have gathered a significant portion of their arsenal from the Yemeni government following the 2015 takeover of Sanaa. At least two Yemeni military missile brigades sided with the Houthis in the takeover, a 2018 United Nations report states.
Michael Horton, a fellow at the Jamestown Foundation who has studied the conflicts with the Houthis, said the group has been at the forefront of a rapid evolution in drone warfare, which has seen the weaponization of relatively cheap unmanned aircraft.

A U.S. Coast Guard crew assigned to U.S. Naval Forces Central Command seized weapons components and supplies suspected of coming from Iran and going to Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen, following a maritime raid in the Arabian Sea on Jan. 28, 2024. U.S. Central Command photo/Released
Amid efforts to expand and improve their arsenal, the Houthis have begun producing some of their basic components domestically, while smuggling in more sophisticated electronics. They often use this pairing of smuggled and self-produced parts to assemble new weapons based on Iranian schematics.
Horton said international counter-smuggling efforts are valuable for slowing the growth of the Houthi arsenal.
“Particularly for the parts to assemble missiles, build drones, that’s still largely coming from outside,” he told The Epoch Times.
The U.S. government has taken steps to identify and apply financial sanctions against individuals and entities who facilitate shipments of dual-use components to the Houthis.
Possible Solutions
Horton expressed doubts that the latest strikes by Saudi-led forces, or further strikes by the U.S. military, will break the Houthi insurgency.
“There’s no military solution for the Houthis,” he said. “I mean, they survived years of Saudi bombing, and just got stronger and stronger.”
Horton assessed that the Houthis could put up a protracted fight in the meantime.
“They don’t have, of course, the same capabilities as Iran, and they don’t have the same kind of strategic depth,” he said. “They don’t have the reserves of missiles and drones, although they’re still considerable. But much like the Iranians, they can continue this for a long time.”
Horton said intensifying strikes on Yemen could reverse a peacetime trend of decaying support for the Houthis, and instead rally everyday Yemenis to their side.

A photojournalist takes a picture of smoke after an Israeli air strike on Yemen’s Houthi-held capital Sanaa on Aug. 24, 2025. Mohammed Huwais/AFP via Getty Images
“There was kind of hints of, as I said, tribal unrest, certainly high levels of dissatisfaction with the Houthis, and if the U.S. gets involved, if Israel gets involved again, most of that unravels,” he said.
By contrast, Coates said more deeply coordinated military action between the United States and Saudi Arabia could substantially diminish the Houthi threat.
“We never really went in and did what needed to be done to the Houthis,” she said.
Protracted conflict with the Houthis could exhaust U.S. stockpiles of both offensive precision strike weapons and defensive missile interceptors.
“That’s definitely a danger, and … a potential problem,” Coates said. “Hopefully, this is an impetus to Congress to do what they should have done 10 years ago in terms of ramping up [arms] production.”
Weapons expenditure has been a persistent U.S. concern throughout the Iran conflict. A recent
report
by the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies assessed U.S. interceptor stockpiles had fallen to fewer than 900 Patriot missiles, and fewer than 300 Terminal High Altitude Air Defense missiles.
