Commentary
What’s a little eavesdropping between friends?
If only that were the case.
China’s Long March Into US Networks
The truth is that China has spent years positioning itself inside the infrastructure that carries America’s most valuable information.
The U.S. House Select Committee on China’s report titled “Stranger Pings: The Threat of CCP-Controlled Infrastructure in the U.S. Communications Backbone” shows without question that China Mobile, China Unicom, and China Telecom have maintained “extensive unregulated footprints” in the U.S. telecom networks.
The committee’s conclusion is staggering. They’ve determined that Chinese state-owned carriers remained embedded in the U.S. internet ecosystem long after federal regulators had determined that they were vulnerable to exploitation, influence, and control by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
Unfortunately, the damage goes well beyond three Chinese telecom companies.
Washington Identified the Threat Years Ago
What’s more, this isn’t a state secret. The federal government has known about the problem for years.
The United States has been trying to force Chinese telecommunications companies out of critical American infrastructure since at least 2012.
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) determined that China Mobile International USA, China Telecom Americas, and China Unicom Americas posed national security and law enforcement risks due to their relationships with the Chinese regime.
As a result, the FCC revoked China Mobile’s U.S. telecommunications authority in 2019. It subsequently revoked the authorizations of China Telecom Americas and China Unicom Americas.
But removing a company’s authority to sell telecommunications services is not the same as severing all its connections to the internet.
Salt Typhoon Proved the Threat Is Real
The strongest evidence of a persistent threat came in 2024.
A China-linked cyber-espionage campaign known as Salt Typhoon penetrated major U.S. telecommunications companies, including AT&T, Verizon, and Lumen Technologies. The attackers gained access to portions of telecommunications networks and systems associated with U.S. lawful wiretapping operations.
And yet, Chinese carriers still maintain relationships with networks, data centers, international gateways, and other infrastructure. That’s the loophole the House committee is now highlighting.
Telecommunications Infrastructure Is Strategic Infrastructure
America’s communications networks are not simply conduits for phone calls and internet traffic. They carry high-level government communications, financial transactions, corporate information, military-related data, and enormous quantities of personal information. Access to those networks provides the CCP with strategic visibility into the U.S. government’s plans and processes.
Not only can China access critical information across U.S. networks, but it has also established U.S. technological dependence on Chinese network infrastructure.
A hostess waits for visitors at the TP-Link stand at the IFA 2020 Special Edition consumer electronics and appliances trade fair on the fair’s opening day in Berlin, Germany, on Sept. 3, 2020. Sean Gallup/Getty Images
If that’s not a self-inflicted strategic and technological blunder, I don’t know what is.
Beijing can not only access corporate secrets but can also target infrastructure used to support government-authorized surveillance.
That’s a strategic vulnerability, and the House Select Committee on China has repeatedly warned that Chinese telecommunications companies can create opportunities for Beijing to obtain information, influence infrastructure, and advance the CCP’s strategic objectives overseas.
America’s Larger Problem Is the Network Itself
That implies a systemic vulnerability. America’s communications infrastructure is deeply interconnected with internet service providers and depends on backbone carriers. Those carriers depend on routers, data centers, international gateways, cloud infrastructure, and undersea cables.
A vulnerability in one layer can provide access to another, and Chinese cyber operations have increasingly targeted this infrastructure. The FBI and other U.S. officials have warned that Chinese state-sponsored hackers have targeted American critical infrastructure, including communications, energy, transportation, and water systems.
This is where the CCP’s strategy becomes particularly dangerous. The objective does not have to be destroying America’s networks. The Chinese regime can quietly penetrate them, map them, and prepare them for future exploitation.
China Has Strategic Leverage
Once inside a network, an adversary can study its architecture, identify vulnerabilities, monitor communications, and potentially establish access points that remain dormant until needed.
U.S. officials have warned that Chinese cyber actors have engaged in “pre-positioning” activities within American critical infrastructure that could enable disruption during a future crisis.
That changes the nature of the threat. Cybersecurity is no longer simply about preventing theft. It is about preventing an adversary from quietly establishing the ability to disrupt the country when it matters most.
Beijing’s telecommunications strategy fits a broader pattern of building infrastructure in a host country, such as the United States, to establish technology standards and create commercial dependence, thereby maintaining long-term access. The result is strategic leverage.
The United States and its allies have increasingly recognized this danger. Washington has restricted Chinese telecommunications equipment, while allied governments have taken similar steps involving Huawei, ZTE, and other Chinese technology companies.
But removing equipment is only one part of the problem. The United States also has to understand who controls the networks, who has access to them, and where hidden dependencies remain.
The Bottom Line
The “Stranger Pings” report clearly warns us that China’s telecommunications presence in the United States is not merely a commercial issue—it is a national security issue.
Washington has already identified Chinese telecom companies as security risks and has taken steps against them. But the House committee says their infrastructure connections have persisted.
Salt Typhoon demonstrated what those vulnerabilities can produce when exploited. China doesn’t need to control America’s entire telecommunications system to threaten it; it just needs access to strategically important parts of it.
The next great-power conflict may not begin with missiles, but rather with strategic U.S. defense networks going dark. That’s why America’s telecommunications infrastructure should be treated as what it has become: critical national security infrastructure and a battlefield in the strategic competition with communist China.
Views expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.
