Washington, Tokyo Strengthen Economic Defenses Against Beijing

The United States and Japan on Sept. 22 moved to align their strategies to address economic challenges and Indo-Pacific security in relation to China.

President Donald Trump sat down with Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi for approximately 35 minutes in New York on Tuesday, two days before the Trump–Xi summit on Sept. 24.

According to a summary published by the Japanese Prime Minister’s Office, the two leaders “exchanged views on issues related to China, including economic security, and concurred that Japan and the United States will coordinate closely.”

They agreed to expand cooperation in fields such as artificial intelligence (AI), semiconductors, and critical minerals to stay ahead in the technology race.

Both sides reaffirmed their commitment to the Quad alliance—which includes the United States, Australia, Japan, and India—and a free and open Indo-Pacific.

The timing of the meeting itself is “the most important message,” said Bonnie Yushih Liao, a senior research fellow at the Japan Forum for Strategic Studies in Tokyo.

“This is not simply another routine U.S.–Japan summit. It gives Tokyo an opportunity to make sure Washington hears the concerns of its closest Asian ally before the United States enters a major negotiation with Beijing,” Liao told The Epoch Times.

Wang Hung-jen, chairman of the Taiwan Society of Japan Studies, said the U.S.–Japan summit reflects Tokyo’s push to ensure its security interests are embedded in Trump’s strategic framework.

“It sends a message to Beijing that even if Trump and Xi establish personal diplomatic ties, the U.S.-Japan alliance will not be sidelined,” Wang told The Epoch Times.

“Reaffirming the alliance’s deterrence, economic security, and Indo-Pacific commitments directly addresses the strategic challenges posed by China.”

Taiwan Factor

Tokyo’s readout of the talks made no mention of Taiwan.

Liao said it would be surprising if Taiwan were completely absent from the U.S.–Japan talks, even if the published account contained no detailed language on the matter.

“For Japan, Taiwan is increasingly connected to Japan’s own security environment,” Liao said.

“A serious contingency in the Taiwan Strait would affect Japan’s southwestern islands, U.S. forces based in Japan, major maritime routes, and ultimately the defense of the first island chain.”

Tokyo can hardly regard Taiwan “simply as a bilateral issue between Washington and Beijing” anymore, according to Liao.

Liao said the deeper question is whether Washington and Tokyo increasingly see Taiwan, the East China Sea, and Japan’s southwestern islands as a single connected area that Beijing must be deterred from encroaching on.

“If that is happening, it is strategically much more important than the wording of any single communiqué,” she said.

“For Tokyo, Taiwan is no longer just a Taiwan issue. It is becoming part of Japan’s own security geography.”

Countering China 

Wang pointed to mineral and AI cooperation as the clearest sign that Washington and Tokyo now read the Chinese threat the same way.

“Beijing has turned rare earths from an economic tool into a strategic weapon,” Wang said.

“Now, the United States and Japan are trying to elevate efforts to reduce dependence on China from industrial policy to alliance strategy.”

While China accounts for roughly 70 percent of global rare earth mining production, it controls close to 90 percent of the world’s refining and processing capacity.

Liao said building alternative mineral supply chains takes years, so joint efforts by Washington, Tokyo, and like-minded nations would work best if they were based on diversification, redundancy, and a collective response.

“Imagine a different situation: a restriction against one country triggers coordinated action among the United States, Japan and other partners,” she said.

“Then Beijing has to make a very different calculation before using economic pressure.”

Liao said rare earth curbs that drive Tokyo, Washington, and others to develop new sources together may ultimately cost the regime more than any short-term political leverage.

“The next stage of the U.S.–Japan alliance will increasingly include economic deterrence alongside traditional military deterrence,” she said.

“The goal is to build an economy that China cannot easily coerce.”